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Contents

Situation Report

Iran 1

Briefs and Comments

Zimbabwe - South Africa: *Breaking Diplomatic Ties* 4

Ethiopia-Somalia: *Situation in the Ogaden* 5

Kampuchea: *Curtailment of Relief*. 6

Nigeria: *Civil-Military Friction*. 7

Syria: *Pressure on Arab Moderates* 8

International: *Nonaligned Meeting on Nuclear Energy* 9

South Africa: *Strikes Abate* 10

South Yemen - Saudi Arabia: *Hasani's Visit*. 10

. 10

Spain-Italy: *Coproduction Agreement* 11

Special Analysis

Afghanistan: *Factional Feuding*. 12

Top Secret

26 June 1980

~~Top Secret~~

SITUATION REPORT

IRAN

President Bani-Sadr and Ayatollah Beheshti may have reached a temporary political accommodation to appease Ayatollah Khomeini.

Bani-Sadr's newspaper on Thursday published an accord purportedly reached between Bani-Sadr and the hard-line clerics in the Revolutionary Council. Khomeini recently has criticized the different factions for their failure to work together.

Khomeini's unhappiness with the situation intensified when one of Beheshti's aides was accused of plotting against the President. Beheshti has appeared anxious to smooth over the incident.

[redacted] Bani-Sadr met on Tuesday with Khomeini. The President then met with the Revolutionary Council and with the central committee of Beheshti's Islamic Republic Party.


Although such an agreement serves the purposes of both Bani-Sadr and Beheshti, it does not mean that a lasting peace between them has been reached. Bani-Sadr, however, appears to have forced Beheshti to compromise, and Beheshti now is able to show Khomeini that he is willing to obey him and is not a threat to his authority. A key test of any accommodation between them will come over the choice of a prime minister.

Military Activity

Tehran and Baghdad are again accusing each other of border violations. Iraq publicly complained on Thursday about a violation of its airspace by an Iranian aircraft, and Iran countered with claims of Iraqi attacks on gendarmerie outposts.



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26 June 1980


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BRIEFS AND COMMENTS



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26 June 1980

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ZIMBABWE - SOUTH AFRICA: Breaking Diplomatic Ties


Prime Minister Mugabe's decision to sever all diplomatic links with South Africa will be welcomed by hardliners in his government who have advocated an end to informal, low-level ties with South Africa. []

Mugabe's statement on Thursday--in which he acknowledged that economic relations will continue--follows the reported decision by the Central Committee of his Zimbabwe African National Union party against acceptance of further South African budgetary support. Reasons for the decision probably include:

- Recognition that the present policy would be difficult to defend at home and lead to embarrassment in the OAU and UN.
- Suspensions that South Africa may be harboring and training Zimbabwean dissidents.
- A belief that it is necessary to break politically with South Africa to hasten internal political change there.
- Pressures from the Frontline States and Nigeria for a tougher stance. []

South Africa--which has an embassy in only one black African country, Malawi--would have viewed the continuation of low-level relations with Salisbury as a political and psychological plus and one that might have made it easier to establish similar arrangements elsewhere in the region. Pretoria will now be watching to see what support Zimbabwe gives South African liberation movements before it decides whether to use its economic leverage. []

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ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA: Situation in the Ogaden

Both Ethiopia and Somalia continue preparing for further fighting

The Ethiopians claimed on Thursday that their aircraft had inflicted losses on Somali forces in the Ogaden east of Uardere. Ethiopia has lost at least two aircraft in raids against Somali forces during the past two weeks.

The Somalis now have only six to eight operational fighter aircraft.

the Somalis will be no match for superior Ethiopian aircraft and pilots.

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28 June 1980

~~Top Secret~~

KAMPUCHEA: Curtailment of Relief

Bangkok has rescinded its order halting air and sea relief shipments to Kampuchea through Thailand, but the continuing suspension of overland shipments--resulting from the Vietnamese incursion--will affect about 1 million Kampucheans. []

Border refugee camps and relief distribution centers were virtually emptied as a result of the incursion and are likely to remain unoccupied for some time. International relief organizations will be slow to permit their employees to return. []

The people in western Kampuchea had depended on food sent overland from Thailand. During the last week in May, Thai border distribution points provided more than 3,500 tons of food, enough to support the approximately 1 million people for the period. []

By comparison, the regime in Phnom Penh claimed that from mid-April through May it had distributed slightly less than 3,000 tons of food outside the capital. That tonnage would provide 1,200 calories per day for fewer than 200,000 persons. []

Unless the cross-border supply program resumes soon, there will be a repetition of last year's famine. With a million more people added to the 4 million already sharing the meager food supplies provided by Phnom Penh, the average Kampuchean diet could dip well below the 1,200 calorie per day level. []

Meanwhile, the UN Food and Agricultural Organization reportedly plans to order the indefinite suspension of relief shipments to Kampuchea in order to focus world attention on the need to speed distribution of mounting stockpiles of relief aid at Kampuchean ports. The FAO headquarters in Rome apparently has been persuaded by its representative in Phnom Penh that rice seed is being used as food and that relief food distribution is being obstructed by uncooperative officials. []

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NIGERIA: Civil-Military Friction

After nine months of civilian rule, inevitable but apparently manageable friction has developed between President Shagari's regime and the military. [redacted]

The government is conscious of the need to keep the military content, [redacted]

[redacted] Last month, the President sought publicly to dispel rumors that a mass demobilization and purge of senior officers was in the offing. Delayed legislative approval of the military budget is another irritant. [redacted]

Key defense and security posts are held by northern Muslims, reflecting the regime's political base and engendering some criticism among other groups. [redacted]

The government also is concerned about the Army's overaged enlisted ranks, noncommissioned officers, and junior officers, who complain of being underpaid and have been targets of a five-year program to reduce the size of the Army. [redacted]

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SYRIA: Pressure on Arab Moderates

Recent statements by Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam and commentaries in the government-controlled press suggesting that Syria will "qualitatively" strengthen its ties with Moscow are designed to prod anti-Soviet Arab moderates to give Syria more financial support and to suggest what Syria might do if the moderates stop opposing President Sadat. [redacted]

Syria appears to be preparing a plea for more aid at the meeting of foreign and economic ministers of the Arab League scheduled to convene in Jordan in early July. The Syrians may want the Arab moderates to speed up payments under the annual subsidies pledged to Syria at the Arab summit in Baghdad in November 1978. Syrian pay increases granted to public sector employees last January probably are contributing to the government's growing need for foreign financial aid. [redacted]

The Syrians probably also fear that opposition by moderate Arabs to the US-sponsored peace process is eroding. Jordanian King Hussein's visit to the US increased Syrian suspicion that he is looking for a way to enter the peace talks. Similarly, the Syrians may believe that the Saudi commitment to the anti-Sadat consensus is weakening. [redacted]

President Assad remains wary of Soviet intentions toward Syria and probably still hopes to avoid signing the friendship treaty that the Soviets have long sought with Syria. [redacted]

[redacted] Assad might take such a step to strengthen his hand against Israel if Arab financial aid to Syria were suspended, or if the moderate Arabs move to support the autonomy talks. [redacted]

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INTERNATIONAL: Nonaligned Meeting on Nuclear Energy

The Nonaligned Coordinating Group for Nuclear Energy begins meeting on Monday in Buenos Aires to discuss nuclear issues and will probably try to coordinate policy positions for those Non-aligned members attending the Second Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty scheduled for August in Geneva.


The growing dissatisfaction of Third World countries with the export policies of leading nuclear suppliers and with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which many believe impedes their nuclear development, will be voiced by the Coordinating Group.

Yugoslavia, itself a Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory, has been urging the Nonaligned Movement to press for unrestricted use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It is preparing to take an active role in Buenos Aires and may be designated to represent the interests of nonsignatory nations at the Review Conference.

Members of the Coordinating Group with ambitious nuclear development programs are among those who will be most active at the coordination meeting. India refused to attend the first coordination meeting in 1978, but has indicated that it may send a delegation to Buenos Aires. Niger is rapidly becoming a significant exporter of uranium.

Although the first Coordinating Group failed to break new ground in 1978, the advance preparations this time have been more extensive. Earlier this month, for example, the head of the Argentine Atomic Energy Commission met with senior nuclear officials in Yugoslavia to plan the agenda and to map a joint position on the issue of unrestricted access to sophisticated nuclear technology.

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SOUTH AFRICA: Strikes Abate

The automotive industry strikes in the eastern part of Cape Province seem to have lost much of their momentum, at least temporarily, but the situation still remains volatile. The majority of nonwhite workers are back on the job in the Port Elizabeth - Uitenhage area, which is still under heavy police and military guard. Widespread strikes could resume at the end of next week, however, if an industrial council scheduled to meet on 4 July cannot satisfactorily negotiate the rejection last week by workers of an offer of a 20-percent pay increase.

SOUTH YEMEN - SAUDI ARABIA: Hasani's Visit

South Yemeni President Hasani is scheduled to begin a visit today to Saudi Arabia and several Persian Gulf states. Hasani will try to convince his hosts that he intends to bring South Yemen back into the Arab mainstream and to reduce Aden's dependence on the USSR, arguing that he needs his hosts' financial help to do so. This tactic has been employed before by South Yemen, and although the Saudis strongly wish to wean Aden from the Soviets, they are likely to adopt a wait-and-see approach.

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SPAIN-ITALY: Coproduction Agreement

Spain and Italy recently signed an agreement that for the first time calls for the coproduction of weapons and electronics. In the past, Spain and Italy have collaborated on military contracts, but have stopped short of a formal agreement for coproduction. The decision to expand military cooperation reflects a growing trend among arms producers throughout Europe to share the burden of escalating costs for arms research and development.

While details of the types of weapons to be produced have not been disclosed, the coproduction probably will begin on a limited scale. Spain is engaged in a major effort to increase operational capabilities and modernize material, particularly in the Navy and the Air Force. Spain also has been increasingly active in trying to expand military relations with NATO members, a move preparatory to entry into NATO. Italy has strong financial incentives to expand its arms export market.

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

AFGHANISTAN: Factional Feuding

[REDACTED]

Factional infighting is intensifying within the Communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, virtually the sole source of Afghan support for the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul. Constant Soviet pressure on the feuding factions--President Babrak Karmal's Parcham (Banner) faction and the Khalq (People's) faction of former Presidents Amin and Taraki--has prevented the government from falling apart. Rumors abound that the Soviets will replace Babrak, but no new leader would be able to reduce the deep distrust between the two factions or broaden the government's popular base. [REDACTED]

The Communist People's Democratic Party was established under the leadership of Nur Mohammed Taraki in 1965, but it split two years later when a group including Babrak broke away and formed the Parcham faction. For the next 10 years the two Communist groups functioned as separate parties. [REDACTED]

The Parcham faction is somewhat more pro-Soviet than the Khalq faction. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
28 June 1980

Top Secret

In July 1977, the two Communist groups united at Soviet urging. The following April, having obtained the support of the military, they killed President Daoud in a bloody coup and established the country's first Marxist government with Taraki as President. [redacted]

Factional infighting and jockeying for power resumed almost immediately. In June and July of 1978, Taraki and his chief lieutenant, Hafizullah Amin, with the backing of General Abdul Qader and key military officers, exiled Babrak and most of the Parchamist leaders to diplomatic posts. [redacted]

Intervention Deepens Split

The invading Soviets must have had reservations last December about the new coalition of the two factions even as they were establishing it under Babrak after deposing Amin. Total Communist Party membership probably is no more than 10,000, and the Soviets and Babrak probably have concluded that they must work with all available party members. [redacted]

Many Khalqis ridicule Babrak for having "ridden into power on a Soviet tank." They believe that the Soviets' expanding control of internal security, particularly in the cities, has turned most of the population against the regime. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Parchamist-Khalqi rivalry in ministries and departments is bringing government operations to a standstill [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

such events are accelerating the disintegration of the Army, forcing the Soviets to shoulder more of the burden of fighting the insurgents, and making "Afghanization" of the war even more remote. [REDACTED]

Alternatives to Babrak

If the Soviets decide that Babrak must go, they probably would want to avoid the embarrassment of another coup in which their role would again be so obvious. They might either contrive Babrak's "resignation" and the "election" of a successor or they could acquiesce in an Afghan-inspired coup that offered some chance of stronger leadership. [REDACTED]

The Soviets would look for someone who might command the loyalty and rebuild the morale of the military and make some headway in securing popular support for the revolution. None of the possible choices are likely to be able to deal successfully with the regime's virtually insurmountable problems [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
28 June 1980

~~Top Secret~~

[REDACTED]

In the end, the Soviets may muddle through with Babrak. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] he is one of the few leftists who was ever elected to parliament during the constitutional period, and he probably continues to have more backing than the other three among the few Afghans who support the regime. [REDACTED]

The Soviets are unlikely to resolve the conflict between their objective of dominating Afghanistan and their interest in a government that would not be reviled by the Afghan people as an appendage of Moscow. Any new regime sponsored by Moscow, even one including additional non-Communists, probably will not be more effective than the present one in attracting broader popular support. [REDACTED]

The factional split in the regime appears beyond repair, and, under the best of conditions, it could take years to assemble an army capable of making progress against the insurgents without substantial Soviet participation. Moscow may be aware of the open-ended nature of its commitment, and the military and economic resources that the Soviets have poured into Afghanistan suggest that they are preparing for a long-term presence there. [REDACTED]

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